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GP corporatisation: lessons to be learned
M Ke vin Outterscn

To benefit from the US experience of corporetissuon. Australia must focus on the clinical
advantag es rather than the financial windfalls
From rheannual reports of two publidy traded physician pracrice ma nagement corporations:
... The: Compa ny e nha nces clin ic operatio ns by centr alizing ad ministrative fu nctio ns an d introd uci ng management
tools suc h as clin ical guidelin es. urihzaricn review an d
outco mes measurement. The Com pany provides affiliated
physicians wi th access [0 ca pital and advanced managem en t
info r mation systems ...
The Co mpany offers m edical grou p practices an d ind ependen t physicians a range of affiliation m od els. These a ffiliation s are car ried o ut by th e acq uisi tio n of [p ractice] entities
or practice assets, eithe r for cash or through an equity
exchange, or by affiliation on a contractua l ba sis. In all
instances, the Co mpany enters into long-term practice management agreement s that provide for the man agem ent of the
affiliated physicians by the Co mpany while assuring the clinical independ ence of the physicians.
.. . As an integral element of these alliances, the Co mpany
u tilizes sophisticated information systems to improve the
ope rat iona l efficiency of, and red uce the costs associated
with, operat ing the Co mpany's network and the practices of
the affiliated physicians . . . . 1
... (Th e Co mpany) acquires and operates multi-specialty
medical clinics . . . [Its] object ive is to organize physicians
into professionally mana ged networks th at assist physicians
in assuming increased responsibility for delivering cost-effective medical care, while attai ning high-qu ality clinical outcomes and patient satisfaction... .2
the se companies are not ope rating in Aust ralia, although th eir plans m ay sound familia r.
'When these rep orts were written in 199 7, th e United States
had 26 pu blicly trad ed p hysician pr actice management corporaticns.! The two US pub lic corporations described above
emp loyed 5650 ph ysicians, with over 25 000 additional affiliated ph ysicia ns. These rwo co mpanies enjoyed peak stockmarket value in excess of US S6 billion . In th e 10 m onths
following D ecember 1997 , the 15 larges t publicly traded
p hysician pr actice man agement companies lost US S4.8 billion in stoc km arket valu e. s Toda y, M edPartners has utterly
ab and on ed its physician division, while PhyCor is cu rrently
tra ding at less th an 10 cents per share, d own from a high of
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over USS 37 . M ost othe r companies are eithe r de listed or m
ba n krup tcy. A few beca me dotcoms. Something went terribly ......ro ng with corp oratisatic n o f physician practice management in the Unit ed St a tes. Given th e cu rr e nt
d evelopments in Austra lia,' perhap s some lesso ns can De
learned fro m th e U S experience . This article will briefly
examine th ree claim s that physician pra ctice management
corpo rations mak e to attract physician s to corpo rate practice:
clinical independence, efficiency gains, and access to capita1.

Clinical independence
Physicians selling to a co rporate p ractice are p romised c1::1ical ind ependence - th at the allur e of profits will not imp air
th eir clinical judgement. H o......ever, stro ng corp orate pressu res are br ought to be ar on referral patterns. If the practice
own s a pathology or im aging centre, ph ysicians are naturally
incl ined to use th ese facilities. Fo r pra cti ces owned or af!iliated ...... ith hospita ls, th e hospital benefits from inp atu nr
admissions. Ph ysician s owning equity in out patient su rgery
centres like......ise perfo r m proced ures in the se centres. h im ary care ph ysicians em ployed by a mulrispe cialry corporate
practice ma y be encou raged to refer pati ents to specialists
with in th e group. For example, on e o f M edParmer s' large
mu lrispecialry clinics was th e Summit M ed ical Group in
New Jersey. After a conc ert ed effor t to redirect referrals, th e
use of ou tside specialists d roppe d from 30% to 18% of total
referra ls over a two-year peri od ending in 1996. 6
Defenders of th ese practices mak e two points: (i) that
existing ind epend ent pr actices are subject to th e sam e fin uncial pressures - a solo surgeon mak es mon ey by performing su rgery, not by pr escribing pharmaceuticals - an d (ii)
that qu ality is not co mp ro mised, even as referral patterns
change. ' Given th e poor qua lity of truly comparable data on
ou tcomes of medi cal tr eat m ent in th e United States, this
q uality assertio n can not be p roved ," But, if one assum es that
ph ysicians were choo sing high quality providers before, then
......hy s......itch ? If financi al incen tives u nd er managed care can
co mpromise quality,' the same may be true under corpo rate
owne rship.
The first argumen t is more d ifficult to counter. Ph ysicians
in independe nt p ractices have a d irect fin an cial incentive to
see many pati ents and provide int ensive and expensive tr eatm en ts. This is a mor al hazard fo r p hysician s, tempered by
th eir ethical co mmit ment s to pati ents. The difference ..with
corporation s is th e institutionalisation of ethical confl icts.
In stead o f answering to th eir own co nscience, p hysicians in
a large co rporate p racti ce mu st an swer to a corpora te superior , who will be ana lysing practice patterns.
This co uld also be an adva nt age. If a corporate review
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using an evidence-based medicine system identifies physi cians with inappropriate clinical practice patterns, then qualiry may improve in a corporate syetem.e However, if the
-evlew is primarily with an eye to profitability, the opposite
could result.
Federal regulations in the United States discourage finan cial incentives for both referrals and some forms of cost cuttieg, unless the pool of physicians and patients involved is
large enough to give the physician a negligible financial
incentive with regard to any particular p atient." The
premise is that while a physician might subject a patient to
unnecessary and pot entially dangerous treatment for a S1000
financial reward, the same amount of money, spread over
dozens of patients, will prove to be an inadequate incentive
to overcom e professional ethi cs.
Efficiency

Corporations were supposed to bring modern management
practices to the cottage industry of physician pract ices. In
retrospect, th ey added managem ent layer s as well as costs, f
wnere before there had been a single de cision-maker. The
COSt of overheads was very difficult to control, lO particularly
once corporate physicians became agitated and combative.
Many corp orate physicians chafed under wha t they called
microman agemen t . Nurse staffing levels, operating hours,
and innumerable management details were modified to suit
corporate obje ctive s.
Physician productivity also lagged behind expectations: the
entreprene urial ene rg ies of solo physicians wer e dissipated
in the salaried corp orate environment, particularly after
receiving large payments for th e sale of practices and goodw ill.u Some physician s who sold their practices to corp orate
entities in th e lat e 1990s repurchas ed th em at a fraction of
the price a few years later. Others filed suit against their corporations, seeking damages for broken promises and a return
to private practice.'!
One article which is required reading for anyone considering involvement with a physician practi ce management corporation is The rise and fall of the physician practice
management industry, by Professor Uwe E Reinhardt of
Princeton Univer sity.s H e describes the "Ponzi schemes" and
"pyramid sche me " (two fraudulent scheme s which falsely
lure an ever-increasing group of victims to invest money)
which eventually characterised the US industry. The corporations chased unsustainable earnings per share growth,
primarily through acqui sitions, and neglected actual efficiency gains through "same store" growth (ie, increasing the
size of each physician's practice) .f
Optimists continue to point to the clinical efficienc y of an
integrated, multispecialty group practice, particularly if the
practice maintains a single medical record. This practice
model may offer the opportunity for quality and efficiency
gains, but does not require corporate ownership. In the
United States, many successful rnultispecialty group prac-
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rices, such as the Mayo Clinic, are owned either by nonprofit foundations or by physi cians, without any equity
investment of non-physicians.
Access to capital

Public companies by definition can access public capita l
markets that are closed to indep endent medical practices ,
and can deploy the capital to improve services. During the
rapid growth phase of the American practice management
sector, when company shares were trad ing at 40 times their
earnings, promises of lavish clinical spend ing were easy to
make and believe .
When th e bottom fell out of th e market, the capita l markets abandoned the sector quickly,' ! Som e clinics found their
projects cancelled or delayed with out warning. C apital
spe nd ing de cisions should be made for clinical reason s, with
financial pr ojections based on re turn on inves tment, not
un realisti c multiples of projected earnings.
The opportunity in Australia

Au stralian co rp orations have the opportunity to improve
quality and efficiency of ca re. Robust investm ent in clinical
information systems and adoption of best business practices
may be more likely in a corp orate environment . However, so,
too, will be ethical conflicts, short-ter m focu s on profits , and
opportunists who care littl e about healthcare.
If Au stralia is to benefit from th e US expe rience, then its
focu s must be on th e long term and on the clinical advantages of consolidation rather than th e US preoccupation with
earnings growth and finan cial wind falls.
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